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The Spartacus Rebellion, More Than a Slave Revolt
Abstract
The Spartacus Revolt is commonly known for its titular leader, whose deeds have been romanticized in
movies and other media. While Hollywood has led many to believe Spartacus was a revolutionary leader
working to end slavery in the Roman Empire, this is not an accurate characterization. However, that does
not mean that the Spartacus Revolt was nothing more than a historical footnote, although not for its
leader. In fact, the revolt should be seen as a revolt of a middle class of veterans in the Roman Empire
who wanted greater social standing than the end of the Social War had afforded them, rather than a revolt
merely by slaves.
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The Spartacus Rebellion: More Than a Slave Revolt
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The Spartacus Rebellion is one of the most famous
episodes of Roman history. As a result, it has been studied often by
many, from thinkers and authors like Karl Marx to college
students, and even to children learning about Rome. However, one
major mistake that many have made when studying the rebellion is
the assumption that it was conducted and perpetrated by slaves
who had the goal of ending slavery, at least for those revolting.
This is not the whole picture. While it was led by Spartacus, whose
escape from gladiatorial slavery has made for a compelling
narrative, the revolt may have only been as memorable as it was
for the Romans because of the threat it posed with free men
fighting alongside slaves and freedmen. While the presence of
some free men was not unheard or impossible in a slave revolt, it is
important to note that the Romans specifically recorded their
presence. This indicated that free men played a major role in the
revolt’s history and its goals. In essence, many current
interpretations of the Spartacus Rebellion may be missing a key
component of what made the rebellion enticing for Romans of
lower classes to join and threatening to the Roman nobles. To fully
understand the Spartacus Rebellion, a re-examination of the revolt
63

as one of both slave and free men is necessary. The historical
accounts of the Spartacus Rebellion show that lower classes joined
the revolt, while the nobles reacted in fear of the threat the revolt
posed. The combination of which make the Spartacus Rebellion
unique in the Roman history of slave revolts.
According to contemporary accounts made by those alive in 71-73
BCE, and from recorded histories from the centuries following,
there were at least two major slave revolts prior to the Spartacus
Revolt. Yet, these revolts were not characterized as having free
men and citizens as a part of the revolting army. 1 Of course, this
does not mean it is impossible that free men would have decided to
help other revolts for their own gain. A record of such assistance
can be found in the history of the Second Sicilian Slave Revolt.
Historian Diodorus Siculus stated that the slave army was able to
field two thousand skilled cavalry men.2 Considering the amount
of forces Siculus attributed to the slaves, and their reported skill, it
is possible that what Siculus was actually describing was free and

1

Brent D. Shaw, Spartacus and the Slave Wars: A Brief History with
Documents, ed. Brent D. Shaw (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001), pp. 73,
101.
2
Diodorus Siculus, “The Second Slave War on the Island of Sicily: Second
Version,” in Spartacus and the Slave Wars: A Brief History with Documents, ed.
Brent D. Shaw (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001), pp. 109-111.
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enslaved people fighting together.3 As slaves were unable to serve
in the army, it seems unlikely that two thousand rural agricultural
and domestic slaves with the experience necessary to act as skilled
cavalrymen could be gathered in a single uprising.4 Therefore, it is
likely that the only way these troops could have been gathered
would be through the addition of ex-soldiers to the slave army. At
the same time, it would be foolish to simply accept the alleged skill
of an army that lost in a “brilliant victory” for Rome in a history
written by a man who lived in the Roman empire, so skepticism on
the presence of non-slaves in this instance, should be advised.5
Regardless of whether non-slaves participated in other
revolts, it is clear from ancient records that there were at least
some non-slaves involved directly in the Spartacus Revolt. For
evidence one can observe what the ancient historians have
recorded. One ancient Roman historian, Appian, stated that

Siculus, “The Second Slave War,” pp. 109-111; Appian, “The Spartacus Slave
War,” in Spartacus and the Slave Wars: A Brief History with Documents, ed.
Brent D. Shaw (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001), p. 133.
4
Morris Silver, “Public Slaves in the Roman Army: An Exploratory Study,”
Ancient Society 46 (2016): p. 204. doi: 10.2143/AS.46.0.3167455; Sandra R.
Joshel and Lauren Hacksworth Petersen, The Material Life of Roman Slaves
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 63.
5
Siculus, “The Second Slave War,” p. 112; Shaw, Spartacus and the Slave
Wars, p. 163; Siculus was born in Sicily and lived in Rome when writing The
Library. His work may be biased from his own perspective or from outside
pressure, but to assume that there was no bias would be a folly, especially when
adjectives and battles are involved.
3
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“fugitive slaves and even some free men from the surrounding
countryside” joined Spartacus at Mount Vesuvius.6 Their presence
in the revolting army would explain how the “slave army” was
able to battle real legions commanded by Roman generals sent by
the senate and win.7 Other slave revolts had gone up against
conscripted forces and won, but they had not been able to win
battles against the legions that would inevitably come after them
once the conscripts had been defeated.8 Normal country slaves may
not have been capable of such feats, because they were not trained
soldiers and only a relative few were “employed” in manual labor.
Therefore, there must have been some amount of trained soldiery
involved, such as the freemen Appian mentioned as joining the
ranks and being armed by Spartacus’ army. The question of why
these free men would join a small band of slaves and gladiators is
important to answer, otherwise the revolt will become more
ambiguous. Without any written accounts from participants this is
not a simple nor straightforward question to answer.
The Spartacus Revolt occurred only sixteen years after the
end of the Social War, which expanded full citizenship and rights
to many former allies and Italians. These Italians were now part of
Appian, “The Spartacus Slave War,” p. 133.
Plutarch, “Life of Crassus,” in Plutarch’s Lives, trans. George Long (London:
George Bell and Sons, 1892), p. 49.
8
Barry Baldwin, “Two Aspects of the Spartacus Slave Revolt,” The Classical
Journal 62, no. 7 (1967): p. 293, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3295491.
6
7
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the Roman system, and able to participate more fully in more
Roman life than before. However, they still could not count on
enfranchisement in the Roman political system due to their
distance from Rome where the major elections took place.
Furthermore, those trying to live off the land they gained as
citizens, or as veterans of Sulla’s army, may have had a hard time
competing with the wealthier farmers with connections in Rome.9
This concern for social mobility or just survivability in the Roman
world may have weighed upon the many veterans of the Social
War living in the Roman countryside when a golden opportunity to
exert some force on Rome for change (the background info implied
that it would be in their favor) appeared in the Spartacus rebellion.
This position was supported by Appian who wrote that the Italians
“had sided with the gladiator Spartacus against the Romans, even
though he was a wholly disreputable person.”10 If this group of exsoldiers had made up a majority of Spartacus’ army, it would
explain how they fought so successfully against Roman legions
and why they refused to leave Italy.11 Rather than misplaced
confidence in their ability to fight, the free men were looking to

9

Mary Beard, SPQR: A History of Ancient Rome (New York: W. W. Norton &
Company, 2015), pp. 239-240, 248.
10
Appian, “King Mithridates of Pontus and Spartacus,” in Spartacus and the
Slave Wars: A Brief History with Documents, ed. Brent D. Shaw (Boston:
Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001), p. 137.
11
Plutarch, “Life of Crassus,” p. 48.
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gain status, political power, and possibly wealth through their
uprising, not leave their homes. Given that Spartacus returned with
his army, it may be possible that he knew no one would follow him
to Thrace and decided to stay where he had power even when he
was able to escape.
Despite evidence saying otherwise, ancient sources referred
to the Spartacus Revolt as a slave revolt, not a revolt of diverse
backgrounds. 12 If these historians knew of free peoples taking part,
their method of labelling the revolt would therefore seem to be in
error. However, given the negative view of slave revolts in the
ancient world, as well as the ability of slave to refer to both
enslaved people and ex-slaves, the terminology makes more
sense.13 Terming the Spartacus Revolt a “slave revolt” may have
been both an accurate description of the beginning of the revolt
and a way for later authors, who were of noble status, to defame
those who fought with the gladiators from Capua. This would
certainly fit with some narratives that claimed that calling the
slaves “enemy” was shameful, and that the fact that a gladiator
“the lowest sort of men” were leading them “only added mockery
to the disaster itself.”14
12

Shaw, Spartacus and the Slave Wars, pp. 73, 101.
Baldwin, “Two Aspects,” pp. 289-290; Beard, SPQR, p. 332.
14
Florus, “A Detailed Synopsis of the Spartacus War,” in Spartacus and the
Slave Wars: A Brief History with Documents, ed. Brent D. Shaw (Boston:
Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001), pp. 147-148.
13
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To understand why there was resentment from Roman
nobles against this revolt in particular, the fear that Spartacus
caused in the noble ranks must be examined in comparison to other
revolts. One way the revolt inspired fear in the nobles was through
its proximity to Rome. Nevertheless, other revolts had occurred
even closer than Capua—for example, one revolt occurred in 196
BCE in Etruria—and never had the same effect on Rome as
Spartacus’ revolt did.15 The Spartacus Revolt was different
because of its size. Prior to its inception, large scale slave wars or
revolts had been outside the view of the city of Rome. The closest
contemporary slave wars fought by Rome before Spartacus were in
Sicily in 135 BCE and 104 BCE.16 While these slave revolts were
close to the Italian peninsula, they were still far enough away that
they could be put down without any real or perceived threat to
Rome materializing, even if Rome had to use actual legions.
Spartacus’ army was able to defeat these legions, and it took some
serious work from multiple commanders, including Crassus and
Pompey, to decisively defeat Spartacus’ army after suffering
numerous defeats of their own.17

Livy, “A Slave Rebellion in Etruria Is Suppressed in 196 B.C.E.,” in Spartacus
and the Slave Wars: A Brief History with Documents, ed. Brent D. Shaw (Boston:
Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001), p. 64.
16
Shaw, Spartacus and the Slave Wars, pp. 73, 101.
17
Plutarch, “Life of Crassus,” pp.48-51.
15
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It is easy to see how such a successful revolt could be
frightening to nobles accustomed to hearing reports of the revolts
rather than seeing them for themselves. This was the same
conclusion that Plutarch reached as he stated that the Senate was
“moved by fear and the danger” of the revolt enough to send both
consuls, Gellius Publicola and Lentulus Clodianus, to deal with the
revolt in 72 BCE and Crassus with multiple legions of his own
after the consuls’ defeat.18 Crassus even believed he might need
help and asked the Senate to send for Pompey and Lucullus, from
their respective posts in Iberia and Thrace, so that they might help
him against Spartacus.19 Such actions were not that of a confident
people ready to put down a simple slave revolt like many times
before. Orosius later drew upon the lost works of Livy to claim
that Spartacus and the death of Gaius Cassius had caused terror to
“spread through the city of Rome, just as it had when Hannibal had
threatened its gates.”20 He later stated that this fear was “universal”
as not only were “individual consuls… frequently defeated badly,”

Plutarch, “Life of Crassus,” pp. 48-49.
Plutarch, “Life of Crassus,” p. 51.
20
Orosius, “An Account of the Opening and Closing Phases of the War,” in
Spartacus and the Slave Wars: A Brief History with Documents, ed. Brent D.
Shaw (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001), p. 145.
18
19
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along with their combined forces, but the war “was the cause of
terrible horrors.”21
However, Rome had faced terrible wars with many
casualties before even exceeding the most radical estimates of over
one hundred thousand casualties of slaves, not counting the dead
Roman soldiers.22 While is hard to ascertain how many casualties
resulted from the war with Spartacus it would be irresponsible to
believe this was more catastrophic than other contemporary wars,
such as the Social War. Therefore, there must be another reason
besides proximity and size that the Romans spent the next decade
after the death of Spartacus hunting down the remnants of his
army.23 In fact, when the general Gaius Octavius was tasked with
rooting out the final remnants of Spartacus’ forces finally did so in
62 BCE, he found they had joined up with the remnants of
Cataline’s army in the Thurii countryside.24 The reason these
groups joined together may have been nothing more than necessity
of survival for shrinking groups of bandits. But that attributes no
Orosius, “An Account,” p. 146.
Orosius, “An Account,” p. 146.
23
Suetonius, “Operations against Remnant Rebel Slaves of the Spartacus War in
Southern Italy in the late 60s B.C.E.,” in Spartacus and the Slave Wars: A Brief
History with Documents, ed. Brent D. Shaw (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s,
2001), p. 160.
24
Aldo Schiavone, Spartacus (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), pp.
144-145. ProQuest Ebook Central.
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/gettysburg/detail.action?docID=3301224.
21
22
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goals for either group than subsistence. Cataline’s forces wanted to
make change in Rome, and the Italian free men of Spartacus’ army
had their own goals when taking up arms. Mithridates believed he
could incite the freemen of Italy to arms with promises of change,
it is possible Cataline, and the Roman nobles, thought he could do
the same.25
It was this revolutionary character that made Spartacus’
uprising a revolution and not merely a revolt. Not because
Spartacus himself had high ideals of changing Rome, he just
wanted to go home to Thrace, but because his followers had their
own agenda. The agenda of the Italian soldiers to gain power and
influence would even explain why nobles believed Spartacus
would march on Rome, despite his lack of ability to do so.26 The
nobles were afraid of the change this army could enact, so much
that they believed it could happen, even a decade after Spartacus
was defeated.
As a result, the Spartacus Rebellion has been hard to
classify. It was not a Marxist style revolution of lower classes; it
would be wrong to say the veteran landowners were proletarii or
proletariat in a Marxist sense. It would also be wrong to call it
merely a slave revolt, as the army must have at least been
Appian, “King Mithridates of Pontus and Spartacus,”, p. 137.
Plutarch, “Life of Crassus,” p. 51; Appian, “The Spartacus Slave War,” p.
134.
25
26

72

populated by many free men to give it the necessary skill in battle
to survive. Perhaps this is why the revolt has remained murky for
such a long period of time; Marxists have read into Spartacus the
high ideals they wish he had, while other historians, more skeptical
of a deeper cause or background for the revolt (or perhaps just fans
of pattern recognition), have preferred to see the revolt as just
another slave revolt. What seems to be the case is that the
Spartacus Revolt started to escape slavery for the gladiators in
Capua, and somehow gained the support of opportunistic veterans
who had hoped for a chance to gain more political influence in
Rome. In that way, the Spartacus Rebellion is closer to a second
Social War than anything else, although much more limited in
scope. Regardless, it is quite the unique event when compared to
other slave revolts, and even compared to other wars. No other
contemporary event, other than the Social War, had caused more
division in Rome, fear in the nobles, and inspired more free men to
take up arms prior to the Civil War between Pompey and Caesar.
However, even those wars did not have such a “cinematic” or
modern hero, as the gladiator turned rebel leader, Spartacus.
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